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Inflationary tendencies of public debt have been the cause of an unsettling debate among 
policymakers in Nigeria. Using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) framework, this study 
attempts to investigate the impact of total public debt on inflation in Nigeria for the period 1983–
2018. The cointegrating regression results reveal evidence of a stable long-run relationship 
among inflation, total public debt, money supply, interest rate, economic growth, trade openness, 
and private investment in the presence of structural breaks. Empirical results show that the 
impact of public debt on inflation is statistically insignificant, irrespective of whether the 
regression was in the short or the long run. Hence, the study concludes that inflation in Nigeria 
could be driven by other factors other than public debt. 
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The relationship between public debt and inflation has attracted a number of studies in recent 
years, but with little consensus reached to date. There are different views in the literature on the 
causes of inflation. According to the monetarist, inflation is a monetary phenomenon, arguing 
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that an expansionary monetary policy will increase real output and general price level in the 
short run, while, in the long run, only the price level will increase (Friedman, 1968).  
Recent studies have emerged to show that inflation is not only a monetary problem but also a 
fiscal concern that may come from fiscal deficit or public debt (Bleaney, 1996; Catao and 
Terrones, 2005; Lin and Chu, 2013; Nastansky and Strohe, 2015). Contrary to the monetarist 
view that only monetary aggregates drive inflation, Sargent and Wallace (1981), and Kwon et al. 
(2006) argue that the Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL) identifies the wealth effect of public 
debt as an additional channel of fiscal influence on inflation. They emphasise the role of fiscal 
policy in the inflation process because money supply alone may not be sufficient to pin down the 
time path of inflation. They further argue that the success of monetary policy in regulating 
inflation is determined by its coordination with fiscal policy; hence, high levels of public debt 
stock may be inflationary (Kwon et al., 2006; Sargent and Wallace, 1981). Public debt 
accumulation in financing budget deficits must, therefore, be used with caution and efficiently in 
promoting economic growth in Nigeria. Fiscal policy affects monetary authority’s ability to 
control inflation, especially under a fiscal dominant regime where the central bank may not be 
able to control inflationary pressures effectively (Leeper, 1991).  
The macroeconomic consequences of fiscal policy have continued to be a major concern due to 
its undesirable consequences of pointing macroeconomic variables towards an unsustainable 
path. For instance, Budina and Wijnbergen (2000) argue that since 1989, persistent fiscal deficit 
problems have been the key factors behind inflation volatility for Eastern European countries. 
Islam and Wetzel (1991) also argue that, for less-developed countries, fiscal deficit has been 
blamed for much of the debt crisis, high inflation and poor economic growth. According to Sims 
(2016), a persistent and growing budget deficit will eventually produce inflationary pressures, 
regardless of policies followed by the central bank. Hence, the need for sustainable inflation 
requires effective policy coordination among debt, monetary and fiscal authorities (Central Bank 
of Nigeria, 2011a). According to Fischer et al. (2002), Catao and Terrones (2005), and Lin and 
Chu (2013), there is a link between fiscal deficit and inflation. Similarly, in their studies, 
Bleaney (1996), Kwon et al. (2006), Nastansky and Strohe (2015), and Romero and Marin 
(2017) suggest a link between public debt and inflation.  
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Although a number of studies have been conducted on the link between public debt and inflation, 
very few studies have been conducted on African countries, and where studies have been done, 
the results have been inconclusive. In particular, not many studies have been conducted on the 
link between public debt and inflation in a country such as Nigeria where public debt has 
contributed significantly in the funding of fiscal deficits. It is against this argument while 
considering trends in public debt that the current study undertakes an empirical investigation into 
the individual effects of public debt on inflation in Nigeria. Hence, the primary aim of this study 
is to investigate the impact of public debt on inflation in Nigeria using the ARDL approach. This 
analysis is important going forward, for authorities to pay attention to the macroeconomic effects 
of public debt, especially its impact on inflation in Nigeria. Moreover, apart from contributing to 
the literature on public debt and inflation, to our knowledge, this might well be the first study of 
its kind to examine the dynamic relationship between public debt and inflation in Nigeria using 
the ARDL bounds testing approach.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents trends in public debt and 
inflation in Nigeria. Section 3 discusses the theoretical and empirical literature review. Section 4 
presents the estimation technique and empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. Trends in public debt and inflation in Nigeria  
Figure 1 illustrates trends in total public debt and inflation rate using annual data for the period 
from 1980 to 2018 in Nigeria. Nigeria's total public debt stock had evolved in the last three 
decades. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), this represent a decrease from 
19.83% in 1980 to 16.07% in 2018, with a minimum of 7.26% in 2008 and a maximum of 
79.38% in 1992 (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2004, 2019; Debt Management Office Nigeria, 2006). 
The ratio between 1980 and 2004, before external public debt relief in 2005, averaged 44.34%, 
compared to 11.15% between 2007 and 2018, after the implementation of the third phase of the 
Paris Club debt deal and the exit from London Club debt obligations in 2006 (Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 2004, 2019; Debt Management Office Nigeria, 2006).   




Sources: CBN (2004); World Bank (2019); CBN (2019) - Authors’ compilation using Excel 
The composition of Nigeria's total public debt stock can be broadly categorised into external and 
domestic public debt. The proportional share of these two sources had alternated since 1980. 
From 1980 to 1985, it was largely dominated by domestic public debt stock and from 1986 to 
2005 by external public debt stock. Starting 2006, it reverted to domestic public debt stock 
having dominant share up until 2018. The changes in domestic public debt stock in the 1980s 
and 1990s resulted mainly from the fiscal operations of the central government’s large deficits 
(Central Bank of Nigeria, 2001; Essien et al., 2016; Titus, 2013).   
Domestic public debt stock since 2001 had gradually increased its contribution to total public 
debt stock. The changes between 2004 and 2005 were as a result of three main factors, which 
were in line with Nigeria’s domestic debt management strategy. First was the development of the 
domestic debt market for financing budget deficits; second was developing and deepening of the 
financial market; and third was sourcing investment funds (Debt Management Office Nigeria, 
2005) Trends from 2006 to 2016 showed a drastic increase in domestic public debt stock. The 
increased changes recorded between 2006 and 2007 were largely as a result of deficit finance, 
securitisation of local contractors’ debt and the settlement of Nigeria Airways ex-staff 
entitlements (Debt Management Office Nigeria, 2006). In addition, increased changes between 
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2008 and 2018 were as a result of government financed appropriated budget deficits, refinanced 
matured securities and special projects expected to stimulate economic growth and poverty 
reduction, and the settlement of part of the arrears to local contractors and other central 
government obligations (Debt Management Office Nigeria, 2016, 2018).   
Prior to external public debt relief in 2005, total public debt was characterised by huge external 
borrowing by the government in meeting its financing needs, which resulted in public debt stock 
that was largely dominated by external public debt stock (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2001; Debt 
Mangement Office Nigeria, 2006). For instance, between 1986 and 2006, a decrease was 
recorded in 1996 as a result of external public debt reconciliation exercise with creditors to 
confirm the authenticity of some external claims. Thereafter, external public debt stock 
continued to grow as a result of the capitalization of defaulted interest payments and 
accumulation of payment arrears even when no new loans was contracted up until 2005 (Titus, 
2013). There was a significant drop in external public debt stock in 2005 by 44.9% and further in 
2006 by 83.3% (Debt Management Office Nigeria, 2006). The reduction in 2005 was as a result 
of the implementation of the first and second phases of the Paris Club debt relief deal, which 
paid off all the arrears on Paris Club debt and reduced the stock by 33.0%. The significant 
reduction in 2006 was as a result of the implementation of the third phase of the Paris Club debt 
deal and the exit from London Club debt obligations (Debt Management Office, Nigeria, 2006). 
As shown in Figure 1, these changes reduced total public debt to GDP ratio from 36.14% in 2004 
to 18.95% in 2005 and 7.69% in 2006.  
A closer look at the trend for total public debt to GDP ratio from 2006 reveals an upward trend in 
this ratio. The change in this ratio from 2005 was largely driven by domestic public debt stock 
accumulation, which can be attributed to government deepening of the financial market through 
the development of financial instruments and domestic debt finance of budget deficits (Debt 
Management Office Nigeria, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2018; Titus, 2013). The composition of Nigeria’s 
public debt stock stood at 37.78% for external public debt stock and 62.21% for domestic public 
debt stock while total public debt to GDP ratio stood at 16.07% as at end 2018 (Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 2019). The composition ratios compare favourably to the optimal target of 60:40 for 
domestic and external debt, respectively, by end 2019 as contained in the 2016–2019 Nigeria’s 
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Debt Management Strategy (Debt Management Office Nigeria Nigeria, 2016) Overall, for the 
study period, increased changes in the public debt stock were largely through the implementation 
of domestic debt management strategies and fiscal excesses.  
With respect to inflation rate in Nigeria, Figure 1 reveals mixed inflation movements during the 
study as inflation hovered across single- and double-digit rates. As indicated in Figure 1, 
between 1980 and 2018, Nigeria recorded several experiences of high inflation rate in excess of 
25%. According to Masson et al. (1997), once a country experiences annual inflation rates in the 
range of 15%-25% for a number of consecutive years, it will be unable to rely on monetary 
policy alone to target a stable and reduced inflation rate. At high rates of inflation, fiscal and 
monetary policies become virtually inseparable. As revealed in Figure 1, Nigeria recorded its 
highest inflation rates in the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, the country recorded rates as high as 
57.17% in 1993 and 72.84% in 1995.   
In the 1980s inflation was largely influenced by government’s expansionary fiscal operations 
that were financed by the Central Bank of Nigeria’s credit and monetisation of oil revenue, and 
the repurchase of external debt with new local currency obligation (Bawa et al., 2016; Moser, 
1994). This episode, which persisted into the 1990s, coincides with a period of expansionary 
fiscal deficit and high money supply growth that exacted higher inflationary pressures through 
growth in money supply (Bawa et al., 2016; Moser, 1994). For the period from 2000 to 2018, 
double-digit rates were largely recorded for inflation rate even though single digit rates were also 
recorded occasionally during this period. Inflation rate was at its minimum for this period at 
5.39% in 2007 and maximum at 18.87% in 2001. The change to double digit in 2008 was 
attributed to global food shortages and financial crisis, while, in other periods, double-digit 
inflation largely due to expansionary fiscal and monetary policy operations (Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 2010). Overall, even though there are other factors, such as depreciation in exchange 
rate, inadequate power supply, and weak infrastructure facilities that have contributed to changes 
in inflation rate for the period under review, major changes in inflation rate were largely due to 
excess domestic demand generated by expansionary fiscal and monetary policy in Nigeria. 
Annual inflation rate stood at 12.09% in 2018 compared to 9.97% in 1980.   
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Although the descriptive analysis above provides us with some insight into the reality of public 
debt and inflation in Nigeria, it is important to note that such analysis only gives or shows a 
general picture. To complement this analysis, it is paramount to undertake an econometric 
investigation of the individual effect associated with public debt given its significant role in 
fiscal policy determination for the study period in Nigeria.  
3. Literature review  
3.1. Theoretical literature review  
Theoretically, the most widely accepted school of thought on inflation is that it is a monetary 
phenomenon and its control is within the purview of the monetary authorities. According to 
Friedman (1968), inflation is a monetary phenomenon. An expansionary monetary policy will 
increase both real output and general price level in the short run, while, in the long run, only the 
price level will increase (Friedman, 1968). The monetarist theory of price level determination is 
based on the argument that the monetary authority has total control over prices. The theory is 
defined by active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy operating within a Ricardian 
framework (Erdogdu, 2002).  
There are, however, two competing views on the interaction between monetary and fiscal 
policies and their effects on price stability. The classical view of Ricardians argues that it is the 
demand for liquidity and its progress over time that defines the path of prices (Attiya et al., 
2008). In such rule, fiscal policy is passive, suggesting that government bonds are not net wealth, 
and monetary policy works through interest rates to determine prices. The Ricardian view 
assumes that price levels are mainly determined by money supply in the long run (Attiya et al., 
2008). The Ricardian equivalence, according to Barro (1974, 1989), is based on a monetarist 
view on inflation that government deficit or public debt does not have a significant impact in the 
determination of price level, implying that government bonds are not net wealth. He argues that 
household wealth is effectively reduced because the existence of uncertainty with respect to 
individual future tax liabilities, suggesting that public debt may increase the overall risk 
contained in household balance sheets.   
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According to Leeper (1991), Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) and Marzieh (2015), an active 
monetary policy with a passive fiscal policy would yield a Ricardian equilibrium, suggesting that 
debt management policy has no monetary significance. An active monetary policy and a passive 
fiscal policy, with a fiscal policy that adjusts taxes sufficiently in response to government debt 
will produce the monetarist outcome that inflation is always a monetary phenomenon. In 
addition, Oscar (2007) further argues that when government policy is formulated in such a way 
that intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied for any price level, it is a Ricardian policy. It is a 
non-Ricardian policy when it satisfies only the equilibrium price level. This argument is also 
supported by the study conducted by Erdogdu (2002). This study reveals that the relationship 
between real value of government debt and price level can be Ricardian or non-Ricardian policy 
depending on the fulfillment of government budget constraint. It is Ricardian policy if 
government budget constraint is satisfied for all price levels, with endogenous determination of 
monetary and fiscal policy variables.   
The Ricardian policies assume that the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem holds. Meaning that 
public debt or fiscal policy does not create any wealth effects. In a related study, Walsh (2010) 
also establishes the link between public debt and inflation under the Ricardian and Non-
Ricardian regimes. He argues that fiscal and monetary policies are linked through government 
sector’s budget constraint, such that decisions by the fiscal authority can have implications for 
money growth and inflation. The model he postulated shows that public debt is not involved in 
the determination of price level under the Ricardian regime, only nominal stock of money does. 
On the other hand, the model shows that nominal money supply and the nominal stock of 
government’s debt are involved in the determination of price level under the Non-Ricardian 
regime.   
Under the non-Ricardian policy, the inter-temporal government budget constraint is an 
equilibrium condition not satisfied for every price levels. Before the price level is determined, 
the level of surplus is set such that any threat to the solvency of budget constraint is met by 
market mechanism moving the price level. Contrary to the monetarist view that only monetary 
aggregate drives inflation, in a non-Ricardian environment with active monetary and fiscal 
policies, price level is only a function of fiscal policy variables. The non-Ricardian policies do 
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not follow the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem assumption that fiscal policy does not create a 
wealth effect. An increase in the value of government bonds affects the households’ lifetime 
budget set. Fiscal disturbances affect price level through wealth effect on private consumption 
demand (Woodford, 1998).   
In a non-Ricardian plan, price level is fundamentally a fiscal phenomenon, with monetary 
aggregates playing a marginal role (Oscar, 2007). Recent developments in public finance have 
led to a renewed interest in fiscal policy concern for price stability. Expansionary fiscal policy in 
the Keynesian view (increase level of debt or a reduction in tax rates) may lead to price level 
pressures. According to Branson (1989) and Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), expansionary fiscal 
policy in the short run affect aggregate demand by increasing disposable income and generating 
positive wealth effects that may lead to price level pressures. Sargent and Wallace (1981), 
Leeper (1991), and Woodford (1994, 1996, 2001), in their studies, have also shown that fiscal 
and monetary policy interaction is crucial in establishing the relationship between public debt 
and inflation. Hence, the control of inflationary pressures in an economy does not depend alone 
on the control of money supply.   
The fiscal theory of price level explains the relationship between fiscal policy, public debt and 
inflation. Under this theory, changes in inflation rate are not only determined by the volume of 
money supply but largely by fiscal deficits and the stock of public debt used for financing it. 
Hence, variations in inflation rate are largely based on the actions of the fiscal authorities in an 
economy. The FTPL, as embedded in the non-Ricardian policy, seems to have particular 
relevance for developing economies because they issue domestic currency debt and often lack 
the fiscal capacity to mobilise the necessary real tax revenues, giving rise to an “active” fiscal 
authority, while the concerns for capital flows imply that monetary policy tends to be “passive” 
(Beck-Friis and Willems, 2017). More so because these economies are characterised by large 
public debt in the funding of fiscal deficits, Blanchard (2004) and Favero and Giavazzi (2004) 
suggest that an increase in interest rate in an economy with large public debt aimed at controlling 
inflation within the target range may increase the cost of debt service, debt level, default 
probability and country premium, which may trigger capital outflows and exchange rate 
depreciation that would affect inflation expectations and in the end inflation itself. Hence, the 
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source of change in price level in an economy can be explained by FTPL within the framework 
of fiscal deficits and public debt through the positive wealth effect of government debt policy on 
private consumption demand or increased private spending (Castro et al., 2003; Kwon et al., 
2006; Woodford, 1995, 1998).   
The emergence of recent studies has shown that inflation is not only a monetary problem but also 
of a fiscal concern, with fiscal variables influencing price stability. The non-Ricardian 
assumption on fiscal policy forms the key defining characteristics of the more recent FTPL. The 
fiscal theory of the price level shows a more recent explanation in the understanding of the 
consequences of the non-Ricardian view of inflation. According to Kwon et al. (2006), FTPL 
identifies the wealth effect of government debt as an additional channel of fiscal influence on 
inflation. This theory posits that increased government debt adds to household wealth and hence, 
to demand for goods and services, leading to price pressures. The non-Ricardian supporters, in 
more recent times, are of the view that under an active fiscal regime, changes in government debt 
will necessitate changes or fluctuations in inflation even if monetary policy is exogenous; thus, 
the determination of price level in an economy will require monetary and fiscal policy 
interactions (Marzieh, 2015).   
The relationship between public debt and inflation can either be direct or indirect as suggested by 
Nastansky and Strohe (2015). It is direct when the central bank buys public bonds. On the other 
hand, it is indirect when the demand for public bonds is by the private sector. It may also be 
indirect through the banking sector’s demand for public bonds, and through inflation expectation 
of the economic agents owing to high levels of public debt. Sims (2013, 2014, 2016) also argued 
on public debt and inflation relationship that when government want to pay off debt without 
increasing taxes and printing money, they pay off the old debt by issuing new debt. The effect of 
simply rolling over debt according to him is not default, but inflationary. He further concluded 
that persistent and growing borrowings by government would eventually produce inflation 
regardless of policies followed by the monetary authorities.   
In line with all of the above, the surveyed literature established a theoretical link between public 
debt and inflation. Fiscal and monetary policy coordination is, therefore, necessary for inflation 
control, suggesting that public debt may have consequence on inflation. Against this theoretical 
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background, the study will further review empirical studies on the link between public debt and 
inflation that have used different country dataset.  
3.2. Empirical literature review   
On the empirical front, the relationship between public debt and inflation was pioneered by 
Musgrave (1949) and Phelps (1973). Musgrave (1949) opened up the debate on this relationship 
suggesting that if private holders of government securities tried to liquidate all or a major portion 
of their portfolios, where fiscal authorities are the only buyers, the volume of bank credit would 
expand rapidly. Such expansion may not have any direct connection with the legitimate needs of 
the economy, generating an extremely powerful inflationary force. Phelps (1973) argument was 
on the public finance approach to inflation. He suggested that the Central Bank should be made 
the source of inflation, while Treasury is left the freedom to make compensating variations in 
government deficit.   
There are several empirical studies that have investigated the relationship between public debt 
and inflation. Afonso and Ibraimo (2018) adopted the vector autoregressive (VAR) estimation 
method to conclude a positive relationship between public debt and inflation in Mozambique, 
meaning that an increase in public debt level is inflationary. Kwon et al. (2006) demonstrate, for 
a sample of 71 countries consisting of 13 major advance economies, 10 other advance economies 
and 48 developing countries, spanning up to 43 years, that an increase in public debt is typically 
inflationary in indebted developing countries, weakly in other developing countries that are not 
indebted, but generally not in developed economies. Lopes Da Veiga et al. (2016) for example, 
further concluded that a positive relationship is prominent in developing countries with high 
levels of public debt. On the other hand, Wheeler (1999), Taghavi (2000), and Karakaplan 
(2009) found that economies with well-developed financial market, advanced countries, and 
developing countries with low levels of public debt have shown negative relationship between 
public debt and inflation. Wijnbergen and Budina (2001) have also suggested for countries in 
which debt markets are in their infancy, fiscal deficits have played an important role in the 
monetary process and has fuelled inflation.    
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Cardoso and Fishlow (1990) opine for Brazil that inflation acceleration between 1979 and 1985 
was linked to the switch from external to domestic finance of budget deficit in the country. The 
switch from external to domestic budget deficit finance pushed both real interest rates and 
inflation rate upward between 1979 and 1985. In Nigeria, for instance, after external public debt 
relief, there has been a switch from external to domestic budget deficit finance, largely because 
of tax revenue shortfalls. Recent data has also shown that domestic public debt stock constitutes 
a significant portion of total public debt stock in Nigeria (Debt Management Office Nigeria, 
2009, 2011, 2014, 2018; Central Bank of Nigeria, 2019).    
Bildirici and Ersin (2007) suggested that inflationary process is unavoidable through the wealth 
effect with increases in domestic debt and decreasing maturity rates. They argue for emerging 
countries that inflation spirals experienced by most of these countries could be explained by the 
cost of domestic debt. Countries experiencing inflationary periods follow interest rate policies 
resulting from tight monetary policies. This process further increases interest payments and 
amplifies domestic debt stock. They further argue that a country may eventually secure debts at 
higher cost and low maturity and further contributing to inflationary pressure. In another related 
study by Ahmad et al. (2012) in Pakistan, their findings corroborate the argument put forward by 
Bildirici and Ersin (2007). They concluded for Pakistan that the stock of domestic debt and its 
related debt service cost has contributed to fluctuations in general price level. On the other hand, 
for external debt, Karakaplan (2009), for the period from 1960 to 2004, revealed the effects of 
external public debt on inflation in 121 countries that included developed, emerging market and 
developing countries. Results from the study support the hypothesis that external debt is less 
inflationary in economies with well-developed financial markets. The study further suggests that 
the relationships are heterogeneous across countries.   
Lopes Da Veiga et al. (2016) suggest that the relationship between public debt and inflation 
depends on the level of indebtedness. They demonstrate that high levels of public debt reflect a 
positive relationship with inflation. Meaning that in the group of 52 African countries studied 
between 1950 and 2012, high level of public debt contributed to increasing inflation rates in 
these countries. Results from the study further underline the importance of different levels of 
public debt, and their relationship with inflation. In a related study, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
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revealed for emerging market economies that high public debt levels coincided with higher 
inflation episodes. On the other hand, for advance economies, there was no systemic relationship 
between high levels of public debt and inflation for a sample of 20 advanced economies and 24 
emerging market economies that were examined over the period from 1946 to 2009. In a more 
recent study, Romero and Marin (2017) using data for the period 1961 to 2015, for 52 countries, 
found, for countries whose public debt was already high, a positive relationship between public 
debt and inflation. Meaning further increases in public debt are inflationary in those countries for 
the study period.   
Sims (2013, 2014, 2016) demonstrates that the effect of paying off old debt by issuing new debt 
(rolling over debt) is not default but inflation. When the government pays off debt without 
increasing taxes and printing money, inflationary pressure is not as a result of the size of the debt 
alone but also the size of the debt relative to public’s expectations of future tax increases and 
spending cuts to finance the debt. The study concluded that regardless of policies followed by the 
monetary authorities, persistent and growing borrowings by a government would eventually 
produce inflation.   
Bleaney (1996), Bilan and Roman (2014), Nguyen (2015), and Nastansky and Strohe (2015) 
further argue for a positive relationship between public debt and inflation, while Wheeler (1999), 
Taghavi (2000), and Essien et al. (2016), on the other hand, argued for a negative relationship 
between these variables. There is a dearth in literature on the negative relationship between 
public debt and inflation. Although studies have not established any conclusive and consistent 
evidence on the relationship between public debt and inflation, findings have shown different 
results based on countries, estimation methods used and/or variable selected for estimation. 
Evidence on the impact of public debt on inflation from literature reviewed in this study tilts 
towards a positive relationship. Table 1 summarises the results of the selected studies that have 
assessed the nature of the relationship between public debt and inflation.  
















Taghavi (2000) France, Germany, Italy 
and  United Kingdom 
• Hybrid cointegration analysis 





Kwon et al. (2006) 71 countries (13 major 
advance economies; 10 
other advance economies; 
and 48 developing 
countries) 
• Vector autoregression (VAR)  
• Pooled panel OLS 
• Dynamic fixed effects panel  
• Panel generalised method of 
moments (GMM) Arellano-Bond 
Positive 
Bildirici and Ersin 
(2007) 
Emerging and developed 
economies 
• Vector Error Correction models 
• Panel cointegration models 
Positive 
Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010) 
20 advanced economies 
24 emerging market 
countries 





Ahmad et al. (2012) Pakistan • OLS estimation technique Positive 
Ngerebo (2014) Nigeria • OLS estimation technique Positive 
Bilan and Roman 
(2014) 
22 developed and 
developing countries 
• Analysis of relevant statistical 
data 
Positive 
Lopes da Veiga et al. 
(2016) 
52 African economies • Pooled analysis of relevant 
statistical data. 
Positive 
Nastansky and Strohe 
(2015) 
Germany • Vector Error Correction Model 
• Generalised Impulse Response 
analysis 
• Multivariate Beveridge-Nelson 
trend/cycle decomposition 
Positive 
Nguyen (2015) 60 developing countries 
(22 in Asia, 11 in Latin 
America and 27 in Africa) 
• Panel generalised method of 
moments (GMM) Arellano-Bond 
Positive 
Romero and Marin 
(2017) 
52 Countries • Vector autoregression (VAR)  
• Dynamic fixed effects panel 
• Panel generalised method of 
moments (GMM) Arellano-Bond 
Positive 
Afonso and Ibraimo 
(2018) 
Mozambique • Vector autoregression model 
• Impulse response functions 
• Variance decomposition 
Positive 
Negative Association 
Bleaney (1996) 15 OECD countries • Ordinary Least Square Negative 
(1983-1989) 
Wheeler (1999) United States • Vector autoregressive model 
• Impulse response function 














Karakaplan (2009) 121 countries • Panel generalised method of 







Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010) 
20 advanced economies 
24 emerging market 
countries 





Essien et al. (2016) Nigeria • VAR framework 
• Granger causality analysis  
• Impulse response function 
• Variance decomposition 
Negative 
Source: (Aimola and Odhiambo, 2020) 
In Nigeria, total public debt to GDP ratio has reduced significantly in recent years at rates below 
55% international debt limit threshold set by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
for countries in Nigeria’s peer group and 70% set by the Economic Community of West African 
States Convergence Threshold. Given the increasing trends in the contribution of domestic 
public debt stock in total public debt stock and trend in government expenditure, the study 
expects public debt to have a positive impact on inflation.  
4. Estimation technique and empirical analysis  
4.1. Model specification and data 
This study investigates the link between total public debt and inflation. In specifying the model, 
theoretical and empirical literature has been used to identify explanatory variables in the inflation 
(INF) function. The model is specified explicitly as follows:  
INF = 𝑓(PD, MS, LR, GDPC, TOP, GFCF) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (1) 
Where, 
INF = Inflation; 
PD = Public debt; 
MS = Money supply; 
LR = Interest rate; 
GDPC = Economic growth; 
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TOP = Trade openness; and 
GFCF = Private investment. 
To investigate and provide estimates of the short-run dynamics and long-run relationships of 
Equation 1, this study adopted the ARDL model approach, and the ensuing model specification 
following Pesaran et al. (2001) is expressed as: 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑2𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∆𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑3𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝑃𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑4𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0







∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑7𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑8𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜑9𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝜑10𝑃𝐷𝑡−1
+ 𝜑11𝑀𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜑12𝐿𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜑13𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝜑14𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜑15𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝜑16𝐷𝑈𝑀98
+ 𝜇1𝑡  … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (2) 
Where all variables remain as defined in Equation 1.  
𝜑0 = constant; 
t = trend component; 
𝜑2 − 𝜑8= short run coefficient; 
𝜑9 − 𝜑15= long run coefficient; 
∆ = difference operator; 
n = lag lengths; and 
𝜇1𝑡 = white-noise error term. 
The dummy variable (𝐷𝑈𝑀98) is introduced in Equation 2 to represent a structural break that is 
endogenously determined by the Zivot-Andrews test in inflation (INF). The dependent variable 
(inflation) undergoes a structural break in 1998. The dummy variable (𝐷𝑈𝑀98) takes the value of 
0 until 1997, and 1 thereafter.  
The corresponding error correction model is specified as follows: 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑2𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∆𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑3𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝑃𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑4𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0







∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑7𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑8𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0




+ 𝜔1𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜇2𝑡   … … … … … … . … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (3) 
Where: 
𝜔1 = coefficient of the lagged error-correction term (𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1). 
𝐷98 = short run coefficient of the dummy variable. 
𝜇2𝑡 = white-noise error term. 
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The study used annual time-series data from the period 1983 to 2018. This period was chosen 
based on availability of reliable data on some variables. The primary source of data for this study 
was World Bank Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2019). The data source for 
public debt was the Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin (CBN, 2004; 2019). Table 2 
further shows detailed sources of data, how each of the data was measured and theoretical 
expectation of the coefficient for each variable. 
Table 2: Data sources and measurement of variables 
Variables Description Measurement Expectation Source 
INF Inflation Consumer prices (annual %) - WB 2019 
PD Public debt Total public debt (% of GDP) Positive 
CBN 2004, 
2019 
MS Money supply Broad money supply (% of GDP) Positive WB 2019 
LR Interest rate Lending rate (annual %)  Positive WB 2019 
GDPC Economic growth 
Real gross domestic product per 
capita, measured as gross domestic 





TOP Trade openness 
Measured as the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services (% of 
GDP) 




Gross fixed capital formation (% of 
GDP) 
Positive WB 2019 
Source: Authors’ Compilation. 
4.2. Estimation technique and result  
4.2.1. Unit root test  
Pretesting variables before proceeding with ARDL estimation is essential. It is necessary to 
conduct unit root tests for all variables to confirm that none is integrated of order 2 or above. The 
presence of an I(2) variable would render the use of an ARDL technique inappropriate because 
the critical values of the F-statistics computed by Pesaran et al. (2001) are based on the 
assumption that the variables are either I(0) or I(1) (see also Odhiambo, 2009). For this purpose, 
the study used the Phillips–Perron (PP) and Dickey–Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DF-GLS) 
unit root tests both at level and first difference. In order to address the structural break issues 
associated with time-series data, the current study adopted Zivot–Andrews structural break unit 
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root test. This test corrects for one structural break endogenously. The results of the unit root 
tests are reported in Tables 3 and 4.  
The results displayed in Table 3 show that none of the variables is integrated of order two (i.e. I 
(2)), or higher for PP and DF-GLS unit root test. Table 4 also shows that the results reported for 
ZA test confirmed that none of the variables is I (2). The structural change in inflation took place 
in 1998. This period coincides with the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) that commenced in 1986. The 1990s was characterised by the indirect control of monetary 
aggregates through the use of market-related instruments in achieving the inflation target (Dada, 
2016). The 1990s, according to Bawa et al. (2016), coincide with a period of expansionary fiscal 
deficit and high money supply growth that exacted higher inflationary pressures through growth 
in money supply. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria (2011b), monetary policy was 
focused within a short-run perspective. The short-term monetary policy framework regime 
showed that monetary and financial targets were mostly missed, and the poor performance for 
this period was largely attributed to expansionary fiscal policies by government and the resultant 
liquidity overhang, as well as by the lack of coordination in the implementation of fiscal and 
monetary policy in Nigeria (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2011b). Because monetary policy actions 
affect inflation with substantial lags, in 2002, the CBN adopted a medium-term perspective in 
monetary policy formulation for unrestricted policy implementation, free from the problem of 
time inconsistency, and to minimise overreaction to temporary shocks (Central Bank of Nigeria, 
2011b). This monetary policy framework is still in operation to date.  
Table 3: Results of standard unit root test  
Variables 
Stationarity of all variables in levels Stationarity of all variables in first difference 
Dickey-Fuller 



















INF -1.1163 -1.7168 -2.5953 -2.6456 -5.9265*** -6.1211*** -9.2090*** -9.2283*** 
PD -1.6684* -2.3823 -1.5313 -2.4106 -4.1520*** -4.2778*** -4.1495*** -4.1464*** 
MS -0.6890 -2.7800 -0.4764 -1.9583 -4.7918*** -4.8802*** -5.0635*** -6.8776*** 
LR -2.0552** -2.6117 -2.6110 -2.4525 -3.6822*** -3.7994*** -6.6059*** -6.7691*** 
GDPC -0.9429 -3.6267** -5.0340*** -4.8034*** -2.2926** -3.8437*** - - 
GFCF -0.7492 -3.1914** -3.0974** -5.2386*** -3.0063*** -4.7029*** - - 
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TOP -1.9058* -2.3993 -2.5642 -2.3823 -7.3176*** -7.3965*** -7.6939*** -13.2102*** 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Note: ***, ** and * denote stationarity at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Table 4: Results of structural break unit root test  
Zivot-Andrews structural break unit root test  
Variables 
At levels At first difference 
t-Statistic Break date t-Statistic Break date 
INF -4.3279 1998 -7.1992*** 1996 
PD -4.2712 2005 -5.0421* 1997 
MS -6.1049*** 2007 - - 
LR -5.7136*** 1994 - - 
GDPC -5.2950** 2002 - - 
GFCF -6.7208*** 2012 - - 
TOP -4.1887 1997 -5.9800*** 2010 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Note: *** and ** denote stationarity at 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
The results reported in Tables 3 and 4 show that none of the variables used in this study is I(2). 
Table 4 shows that structural change in inflation (INF) took place in 1998 during the indirect 
approach to monetary management.  
4.2.2. Bound cointegration test   
Before estimating the cointegration relationship, a dummy variable was introduced in the model 
to capture the presence of one structural break. The dummy variable (DUM98) takes the value of 
0 until 1997, and 1 thereafter. Table 5 presents the results for the bound cointegration test using 
the ARDL technique.  
Table 5: Results of ARDL bound cointegration test  
ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0) Selected based on Akaike Information Criteria 
Dependent 
Variable 




F(INF| PD, MS, LR, GDPC, TOP, GFCF, 
DUM98) 
6.38*** Cointegrated 
Asymptotic critical values 
Critical values 
Pesaran et al. 
(2001), 
1% 5% 10% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
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Note: *** denote statistical significance at 1% level. 
The results reported in Table 5 show that the calculated F-statistic exceeds the upper bound 
critical value at 1% significance level. Hence, the study rejects the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration, suggesting the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship among the 
estimated variables. Given the presence of cointegration among variables, the study proceeds to 
obtain long- run and short-run estimates for the model.   
4.2.3. Estimated long-run and short-run coefficients   
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)-based lags selected for the study were ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1, 
0, 0, 0, 0). Table 6 (Panels A and B) presents the results of the long-run and short-run dynamic 
model estimated within the ARDL framework, respectively.  
Table 6: Long-run and short-run results of the selected model 
Panel A: Long run regression coefficients – Dependent variable is INF 
Regressor Coefficient t-Statistic P-value 
PD 0.7063 1.2616 0.2203 
MS 0.9283 0.7159 0.4816 
LR -0.0113 -0.0053 0.9958 
GDPC -3.6290** -2.4237 0.0240 
GFCF -3.4325** -2.1015 0.0473 
TOP -0.2076 -0.5502 0.5877 
DUM98 0.0195 0.1108 0.9128 
Panel B: Short run regression coefficients – Dependent variable is ΔINF 
Regressor Coefficient t-Statistic P-value 
ΔPD -0.0907 -0.5356 0.5976 
ΔMS -0.7443 -1.0762 0.2935 
ΔLR 1.1156** 2.0879 0.0486 
ΔGDPC -2.2246*** -3.5167 0.0019 
ΔGFCF -2.1041*** -3.1481 0.0047 
ΔTOP -0.1273 -0.5516 0.5868 
𝛥DUM98 0.0120 0.1130 0.9110 
ECM(-1) -0.6130*** -8.2010 0.0000 
C 1.1035*** 7.9508 0.0000 
@Trend -0.0263*** -7.3868 0.0000 
 
R-squared 0.7039   
p.301, Table CI(v) 
Case V 
3.34 4.63 2.69 3.83 2.38 3.45 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.6528   
F-statistic 13.7856***   
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.0000   
Akaike info criterion -1.8011   
Schwarz criterion -1.5345   
Note: *** and ** denote statistical significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Δ denotes first difference operator. 
 
The estimated long-run and short-run results presented in Table 6 (Panel A and Panel B) show 
that the coefficient of public debt is statistically insignificant, irrespective of whether the 
regression was conducted in the short or the long run. This implies that public debt has a neutral 
impact on the inflation process of Nigeria. Hence, inflation in Nigeria could be driven by other 
factors other than public debt. The argument for this result could be based on a similar reason 
highlighted by the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. According to Barro (1974, 1989), the 
theorem is based on the monetarist view on inflation, namely that public debt does not have a 
significant impact in determining the price level, meaning that public debt does not create any 
wealth effects.  
Other results presented in Table 6, Panel A and Panel B, show that the coefficients of economic 
growth are negative and statistically significant both in the short- and long run. These results 
infer that economic growth negatively influences the inflation process in Nigeria. This finding is 
consistent with previous studies, such as that by Stockman (1981), which suggests a negative 
relationship between these variables. The coefficients of private investment are negative and 
statistically significant, irrespective of whether the regression was conducted in the short- or long 
run. This finding contradicts the a priori expectation of a positive relationship between private 
investment and inflation. This result, although contrary to expectation, is not unusual (see also 
Ahmad et al., 2012). In the short run, interest rate has a negative and statistically significant 
impact on inflation, but no significant impact in the long run. The results from Table 6 further 
show that money supply, trade openness and DUM98 have no statistically significant impact on 
inflation, irrespective of whether the analysis was conducted in the short- or long run. This 
implies that money supply, trade openness and DUM98 have a neutral impact on the inflation 
process of Nigeria.  
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The coefficient of lagged error correction term (ECMt-1) measures the adjustment speed of 
inflation to long-run equilibrium. From Panel B, the estimated result shows that the sign of 
ECMt-1 is negative, as expected, and statistically significant at the 1% significance level. This 
coefficient indicates that if the system is shocked in the previous year, convergence to the steady 
state is corrected by 61.3% in the current year. The value of the adjusted R-squared suggests that 
65.28% of the variations in inflation are explained by variations in the estimated independent 
variables.  
The reliability and stability of the model were ensured by conducting diagnostic tests on the 
estimated parameters. Table 7 shows diagnostic test results for serial correlation, 
heteroscedasticity, normality and functional form.    
Table 7: Post-estimation diagnostic test results 
Null Hypothesis (F-statistic) F-statistic  [p-value] 
Breusch-Godfrey Test: No Serial Correlation  0.3073     [0.5852] 
Heteroskedasticity Test ARCH: No ARCH terms  0.2513     [0.6196] 
Ramsey RESET Test: Functional Form  4.0646     [0.0568] 
Normality: CHSQ (2)  1.4535     [0.4835] 
 
As illustrated in Table 7, the diagnostic test statistics reveal that the model passed all diagnostic 
tests. Residuals in the model were not serially correlated. The heteroskedasticity test also shows 
that there was no heteroscedasticity in the error variance. The p-value of the Ramsey RESET test 
is also found to be >0.05, which shows that, overall, the model is normally specified. In addition, 
the cumulative sum of the recursive residual (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares of the 
recursive residual (CUSUMSQ) were used to test the stability of the inflation model. These tests 
have also been used by Brown et al. (1975) and Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) to test model 
stability. The results displayed in Figures 2 and 3 show that the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
statistics are within the critical bounds, suggesting that the model is stable over time.   
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5. Conclusion  
The objective of this study was to investigate the relationship between public debt and inflation 
in Nigeria. Although a number of studies have been conducted on the relationship between 
public debt and inflation, very few studies have been conducted on African countries. In 
particular, few studies on the link between public debt and inflation have been conducted in a 
country such as Nigeria, where public debt has contributed significantly to the funding of fiscal 
deficits. This study employed the ARDL approach to cointegration and the error correctional 
model to examine the link between public debt and inflation in Nigeria—using annual time-
series data covering the period 1983–2018. The study also used the Zivot–Andrews structural 
break unit root test to account for the structural break. The findings revealed a stable long-run 
cointegration among inflation, public debt, money supply, interest rate, economic growth, trade 
openness, and private investment in the presence of structural breaks. Applying the ARDL 
model, the empirical results show that total public debt does not have a statistically significant 
impact on inflation in Nigeria. This finding supports the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, which 
is based on the monetarist view on inflation. The theorem posits that public debt does not have a 
significant impact in determining the price level, meaning that public debt does not create any 
wealth effects. Overall, the study confirms the neutral impact of total public debt on the inflation 
process of Nigeria. Inflation in Nigeria could be driven by other factors other than public debt. 
Hence, the government should continue the implementation of prudent debt management 
strategies that would move public debt into a downward trend. The control of inflation dynamics 
is vital to the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy objective. Notwithstanding the 
promising results, this research is limited by the use of aggregated data for public debt, rather 
than disaggregated data that shows the effect of external and domestic public debt. 
Consequently, we are unable to distinguish the impact of external and domestic public debt on 
inflation. Future research may be able to integrate long length and disaggregated time-series data 
in order to investigate the impact of external and domestic public debt on inflation. This will help 
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